By Sanford C. Goldberg
Sanford C. Goldberg offers a unique account of the speech act of statement. He defends the view that this sort of speech act is answerable to a constitutive norm--the norm of statement. The speculation that statement is answerable to a robustly epistemic norm is uniquely fitted to clarify assertion's philosophical significance--its connections to different philosophically fascinating issues. those contain issues in epistemology (testimony and testimonial wisdom; epistemic authority; disagreement), the philosophy of brain (belief; the idea of psychological content), the philosophy of language (norms of language; the tactic of interpretation; the speculation of linguistic content), ethics (the ethics of trust; what we owe to one another as information-seeking creatures), and different issues which go beyond any subcategory (anonymity; belief; the department of epistemic exertions; Moorean paradoxicality). Goldberg goals to carry out those connections with no assuming something concerning the targeted content material of assertion's norm, past concerning it as robustly epistemic. within the final portion of the e-book, besides the fact that, he proposes that we do top to determine the norm's epistemic common as set in a context-sensitive model. After motivating this inspiration via entice Grice's Cooperative precept and spelling it out when it comes to what's together believed within the speech context, Goldberg concludes via noting how this kind of context-sensitivity will be made to sq. with assertion's philosophical significance.
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Extra info for Assertion: On the Philosophical Significance of Assertoric Speech
But it is also worth pointing out that it is possible as well to reverse the order of analysis here, so that assertoric force is whatever force is distinctive of acts of assertion. Clearly, if one were to employ this order of analysis, one would need an independent characterization of the speech act of assertion. And this is indeed what I propose to offer in this book. ). Rather, we should begin with what we would hope such a characterization could explain. To this end, what I propose to do is to enumerate the characteristic features of assertoric speech.
Certainly, her conception of the speech act of assertion does not warrant this assumption. In sum. It is not entirely clear how many of the features bound up with our assertoric practice can be explained by the common ground approach to assertion. I do not say that these features cannot be explained; only that it is not obvious that they can be. 19 If we find that we can provide a plausible account of these features in some other way, without the need for the various auxiliary hypotheses, such an account is to be preferred.
It is uncontroversial, I suppose, to say that it is by way of assertions that one can (and typically does) communicate one’s knowledge to others. Stronger, assertions are apt for such a knowledge-communicating use. That is to say, assertion is the sort of speech act which is such that both speaker and hearer are aware of the knowledge-communicating use, and both are prepared to treat the act accordingly. Thus speakers are prepared to employ the act—that is, to make an assertion—when they aim to communicate knowledge, and hearers are prepared to comprehend the act of assertion in terms of a default (albeit defeasible) assumption that the speaker is aiming to communicate knowledge.