By Elke Brendel, Visit Amazon's Christoph Jäger Page, search results, Learn about Author Central, Christoph Jäger,
Contextualism has turn into one of many top paradigms in modern epistemology. based on this view, there is not any context-independent regular of information, and accordingly, all wisdom ascriptions are context-sensitive. Contextualists contend that their account of this research permits us to solve a few significant epistemological difficulties equivalent to skeptical paradoxes and the lottery paradox, and that it is helping us clarify quite a few different linguistic information approximately wisdom ascriptions. the obvious ease with which contextualism turns out to unravel a number of epistemological quandaries has encouraged the burgeoning curiosity in it.
This complete anthology collects twenty unique essays and demanding commentaries on various facets of contextualism, written by way of best philosophers at the subject. The editors’ advent sketches the old improvement of the contextualist flow and gives a survey and research of its arguments and significant positions. The papers discover, inter alia, the primary difficulties and clients of semantic (or conversational) contextualism and its major substitute techniques similar to inferential (or factor) contextualism, epistemic contextualism, and advantage contextualism. additionally they examine the connections among contextualism and epistemic particularism, and among contextualism and balance debts of knowledge.
Elke Brendel is Professor of Philosophy on the Johannes Gutenberg collage in Mainz, Germany. She has released quite a few articles on common sense, epistemology, the philosophy of technology, and the philosophy of language. She is the writer of Die Wahrheit über den Lügner (The fact concerning the Liar, 1992), Grundzüge der Logik II – Klassen, Relationen, Zahlen (Foundations of common sense II – units, family, Numbers, with Wilhelm okay. Essler, 1993), and Wahrheit und Wissen (Truth and information, 1999).
Christoph Jäger is Lecturer in Philosophy at Aberdeen college, uk, and Privatdozent of Philosophy (honorary place of work) on the college of Leipzig, Germany. He has released various articles on epistemology, the philosophy of brain, and the philosophy of faith. Books: Selbstreferenz und Selbstbewusstsein (Self-reference and Self-knowledge, 1999), Analytische Religionsphilosophie (Analytic Philosophy of faith, ed., 1998), Kunst und Erkenntnis (Art and information, ed., with Georg Meggle, 2004), faith und Rationalität (Religion and Rationality, forthcoming).
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Extra info for Contextualisms in Epistemology
He sees, and says he can see, that there is still some wine left in bottle #3. Can S see what he says he can see? Can he, for instance, see that it not just colored water in bottle #3, something clearly implied by what he said he could see? Clearly not. Should we say, then, that S can’t really see what he said he could see – that there is still some wine left in bottle #3? Why should we say this? Why not, instead, say that he can see this, but his claim to see it should not be interpreted as a claim to see, or even to be able to see, that it is wine and not colored water.
All I said, to someone who wanted to know whether they were oranges or tangerines, was that I could see that they were oranges. What I said I knew – that they are oranges – implies, and I know it implies, that they aren’t wax, but if saying, in that ordinary context, that I know they are oranges is consistent with not knowing they aren’t wax, then my not knowing they aren’t wax, both then or now, is irrelevant to whether I knew they were oranges. Agreeing with the skeptic, in the philosophy seminar room, that I don’t now, and never did, know they aren’t wax leaves me (unlike a radical contextualist) free to insist that I nonetheless knew what I then said I knew – that they were oranges.
For example, it seems intuitively correct to say that S, having just parked her car in a pretty safe neighborhood, knows where her car is parked. But it seems intuitively wrong to say that S knows that her car has not been stolen. Possible solutions to the lottery paradox could consist in rejecting PEC or questioning the intuition that S does not know that her ticket will lose. But, as we have already seen, conversational contextualists don’t want to give up the highly plausible principle of epistemic closure.